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Abstract. Besley and Rosen (1998) were the first authors to empirically estimate the 
presence of vertical tax externalities. They tested it on gasoline and tobacco unitary taxes. 
However, they did not take into account the difference in cost of living across states: high 
cost areas pay less in real terms than low cost areas, since the nominal unit tax on 
cigarettes and gasoline does not differ according to the state in which it is applied. 
Consequently, we propose that vertical tax competition can be estimated by deflating all 
financial variables using the House Price Index (HPI), which is disaggregated by states. 
This produces a federal tax variable that is expressed in real terms and shows cross-
sectional variation. This empirical strategy enabled us to disentangle the vertical 
interdependence between state and federal tax rates from aggregate shocks over time, 
using US data from 1975 to 2006 on gasoline and tobacco. We found significant 
horizontal tax competition, which was higher for cigarettes, but no vertical tax reaction. 
The results were robust to the period analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
Resum. Besley i Rosen (1998) van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la 
rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al 
cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no 
varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell 
elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost 
unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost 
s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui 
estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price 
Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable 
impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta 
estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus 
impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per 
als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell 
significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del 
tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període 
analitzat. 
 
 
JEL Codes: H3, H21, H77 
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1. Introduction 
 
The co-occupation of the same tax bases between layers of government might make taxes 
inefficiently high from a social perspective, if taxes are distortionary (Keen, 1998). Co-
occupation creates a common pool problem. Each sub-central government sets taxes 
without taking into account the erosion of federal revenues, and so underestimates the 
reduction in the level of federal public good provision in its own jurisdiction. 
 
In the literature, the presence of vertical tax externalities has been tested by estimating the 
reaction of sub-central government to variations in the federal tax rate. This is an indirect 
test of vertical externality. It implies that the interdependence one might find between the 
state and the federal tax is due to the strategic behavior of the state, which reacts to the 
negative fiscal externality that it is bearing due to a federal tax decision that erodes state-
tax revenues.1 The empirical results in the literature are somewhat mixed: sub-central 
governments react by increasing or decreasing tax rates, which is coherent, to a certain 
extent, with the ambiguous results obtained in the theoretical literature (Keen, 1998; 
Devereux et al., 2007).  
 
Besley and Rosen (1998) were the first authors to attempt to test for the presence of 
vertical tax externalities in unitary taxes. They tested cigarettes and gasoline and obtained 
a positive reaction in both cases (that was greater for gasoline). Regarding cigarettes, 
Devereux et al. (2007) used a different time period, and in some cases estimated different 
equations (e.g., the lagged endogenous variable and/or taking into consideration 
horizontal tax competition), but did not find a statistically significant response, while 
Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) found a negative response. The results for gasoline are 
not so contradictory: Devereux et al. (2007) found a positive or no reaction. In this paper, 
we will reconsider these estimations, and will thus try to reconcile the somewhat 
contradictory results, which were all obtained for the US case. 
 
In all the studies cited above, the federal unitary tax rate did not show cross-sectional 
variation, as it was transformed into real terms by a national consumer price index (CPI). 
The deflation of a federal tax with a national deflator can give a misleading idea of the 
real tax burden imposed at state level: cost differentials impact the value of a federal 
                                                 
1 Direct tests could also be performed to check for vertical externality by estimating the determinants of the 
tax base. For example Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000) calculated horizontal externalities using data from 
municipalities in British Columbia (Canada).  
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dollar differently among states. In a federal country like the USA, economic and quality-
of-life conditions may vary widely according to the area considered. Recent discussions 
in the USA have focused on the fact that high cost areas pay more in real terms of income 
tax for the transfers and federal public goods and services they receive. This is because 
federal income tax is based on nominal income, but its real value varies among 
geographical areas due to differences in the cost of living. In contrast, federal transfers 
and public goods and services are normally indexed using the federal CPI, rather than a 
state cost of living. This asymmetry has generated political attention, as well as recent 
academic interest (Albouy, 2008; Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; 
Glaeser, 1998).  
 
Differences in prices among states can be explained by the general equilibrium trade 
theory (Rosen, 1979; Roback 1982, 1988): the difference in quality of life and in labor 
productivity generates labor migration, and therefore creates gaps in price levels across 
states. Some authors argue that federal taxation should take into account this peculiarity 
through indexation to the cost of living, which is disaggregated by states (Albouy, 2008). 
US congressmen from high cost areas have also repeatedly supported proposals to index 
taxes and transfers to regional cost of living (the Tax Equity Act; the Poverty Data 
Correction Act; the COLA Fairness Act), but none of these acts have been passed. Similar 
legislation is proposed every Congress. The most recent proposal was the Tax Equity Act 
of 2005. 
 
Almost all of the political and academic debate has focused on the unfairness of not 
indexing the federal income tax. However, a similar problem could arise with a federal 
unit tax, such as that on gasoline or cigarettes. In this case, given that the nominal unit tax 
on cigarettes and gasoline does not differ among states, high cost areas pay less in real 
terms than low cost areas. Consequently, this bias should be internalized (i.e., an absence 
of regional cost of living indexation for federal taxation) in the different states’ 
expenditure and tax decisions. Namely, states should set their taxes and level of 
expenditure by evaluating the corresponding financial determinants (e.g., the federal tax 
rate), according to the local cost of living.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no US general state-price index available. Therefore, we use the 
House Price Index (HPI) to deflate the federal unitary tax rate. The HPI is a broad 
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measure of the movement of single-family house prices. It is computed by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight2 (OFHEO), and is a weighted, repeat-sales index, 
which measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancing on the same 
properties.3   
 
A national deflator might also be used to obtain real federal taxes. However, this creates a 
potential identification problem between the variation in the federal tax rate and common 
shocks. This econometric problem was recognized in previous studies of vertical tax 
competition applied to unitary taxes (Devereux et al., 2007). In particular, the 
impossibility of including time effects potentially creates a specification bias, as the 
estimate of the federal variable might pick up the impact of aggregate shocks. This 
problem disappears if we use the HPI deflator—a price index that shows cross-sectional 
variation—as it allows for the inclusion of time effects to control for shocks. 
 
When we used the HPI, we did not find any vertical response for cigarette taxation or 
gasoline taxation. As shown in Section 2, some of the results of studies that used the CPI 
deflator are dependent on the time period considered. In contrast, once we had controlled 
for common annual shocks, our results did not depend on the time period considered. 
Regarding horizontal tax competition, we found a strong reaction for cigarette and 
gasoline taxes. In particular, in the long term, a 1 cent increase in the neighboring states’ 
tax rates provokes a 0.57 cent increase in the corresponding state’s tax rate for gasoline. 
This reaction was even stronger for cigarettes (a 0.87 cent increase). According to 
Proposition 1 in Devereux et al. (2007), if demand is price-inelastic, we should expect no 
vertical reaction and a horizontal reaction of 0.5. Our empirical results were consistent 
with this proposition, as there was no vertical response. However, the estimate of 0.5 for 
horizontal tax competition only applied to gasoline. In the case of cigarettes, the well-
documented presence of interstate cross-border shopping and smuggling (Fleenor, 1998; 
or Farrelly et al., 2003) and the fact that this good is easily storable, which implies scale 
economies in shopping (Scharf, 1999), might make the horizontal reaction stronger.4 This 
positive reaction was also obtained by Rork (2003). 
                                                 
2 http://www.ofheo.gov. 
3 This information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties whose 
mortgages have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975. For more 
detailed technical information, see Calhoun (1996). 
4 For example, when transportation costs are not linear and the price elasticity is still null, the horizontal 
reaction can be higher than 0.5 (Rizzo, 2008). 
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The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the results 
obtained in the previous literature, which all apply to unitary taxes and to the USA; in 
Section 3 we develop our empirical framework and present the data, and in Section 4 we 
present our results. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 5. 
 
 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main results in the literature on testing the presence of vertical 
interactions for unitary taxes in the USA. Besley and Rosen (1998) obtained a positive 
reaction (row 1, Table 1). Their results were checked by Devereux et al. (2007) and 
Frediksson and Mamun (2008) (rows 2 and 3, respectively). We can see that the results 
are highly dependent on the time span: there was a positive result for the 1977-1997 
period and no reaction for the 1975-2001 period. It is also essential to take into account 
horizontal tax competition and the inertia of state tax rates by including the lagged 
endogenous variable. Then, for the 1977-1997 period, the estimated reaction is no longer 
statistically significant (row 4 and 5). Frediksson and Mamun (2008) excluded the 1975-
1981 period, because no nominal tax changes occurred during this time. As a result, they 
found that a negative reaction, regardless of further assumptions about the estimated 
equation (row 6 and 7). Consequently, these authors state “the time period studied does 
appear crucial for states’ responses to federal taxes” (p. 43).    
 
This instability of the estimated sign of the state reaction over time might be due to the 
impact of annual common shocks, which are not properly controlled for in the 
aforementioned studies. This was explicitly recognized by Devereux et al. (2007), in 
which they stated that “the presence of federal variables, which vary only over time, 
preclude the use of time dummies which might otherwise capture aggregate shocks which 
create a common effect across states on cigarette tax rates” (p. 466). This creates a 
potential identification problem, in the sense that the key variable in the empirical 
specification (the federal tax rate) might be confused with a linear combination of year 
common shocks. In Section 3, we will explain how we try to overcome this identification 
problem.   
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Table 1. Review of the empirical literature on vertical tax externalities and unitary 
taxes applied to the USA: the case of cigarette taxes 
 Period Time 
dummies 
Endogenous 
lagged 
Horizontal tax 
competition 
(neighbors) 
Sign reaction 
Besley & Rosen (1998); 
Table 3, 1st column 
1975-1989 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 1st column 
1977-1997 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Fredriksson & Mamun 
(2008); Table 5, Model 
III 
1975-2001 NO NO NO + (not significant)* 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 2nd column 
1977-1997 NO YES NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 4th column 
1977-1997 NO YES YES + (not significant) 
F & M (2008); Table 3, 
Model I 
1983-2001 NO NO NO - (significant)* 
F & M (2008); 
Table 3, Model VIII 
1983-2001 NO NO YES - (significant) * 
Notes: In all cases, the federal tax is instrumented; (*): not fully comparable, as they include additional control 
variables.  
 
With respect to gasoline, the results obtained in the literature are not as contradictory, but 
indicate a positive or no reaction. Table 2 shows these results. Again, Besley and Rosen 
(1998) obtained a positive reaction (row 1, Table 2), which was not robust (row 2) to 
expanding the period to 1997 (Devereux et al., 2007). Therefore, the time span was again 
of key importance. This result does not change if we take into account the horizontal tax 
competition and inertia of taxes (row 3 and 4) (Devereux et al., 2007).  
 
Given the ambiguous results obtained in the literature for the same taxes and country, a 
more robust empirical approach is clearly needed to tackle the identification problem, 
which is namely to disentangle the impact of aggregate shocks on the state tax rate from 
variations in the federal tax rate.  
 
Table 2. Review of the empirical literature on vertical tax externalities and unitary 
taxes applied to the USA: the case of gasoline taxes 
 Period Time  
dummies 
Endogenou
s lagged 
Horizontal tax 
competition (neighbors) 
Sign reaction 
Besley & Rosen 
(1998); Table 3, 
2nd column 
1975-1989 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
1st column 
1977-1997 NO NO NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
2nd column 
1977-1997 NO YES NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
4th column 
1977-1997 NO YES YES + (not significant)* 
(*): However, if the relative horizontal interdependence is based both on neighboring states and on the 
population density at the border, the estimate becomes positive and statistically significant.  
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3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Empirical framework 
 
To test for the presence of vertical tax externalities in the USA, we estimate the tax-
reaction function by relating one state tax to the federal tax for the period 1975-2006. We 
repeat this procedure for gasoline and cigarette taxes. Given that we are dealing with 
unitary taxes, both taxes have to be transformed into real terms.  
 
We then estimate the following equation: 
 
jstjstjstjst
si
jstsitsjst tXTtwt εμβγϕφα ++++++= −
≠
∑ 1                                                      [1] 
 
where jstt  is the real tax rate on commodity j for state s and year t; sα is a state fixed 
effect; tφ  is a year effect; ∑
≠ si
jstsitw  is the average real tax rate for commodity j of the 
neighboring states of state s in year t, where siw are identical exogenous weights, 
normalized such that ∑
≠
=
si
si 1ω , which account for the relative interdependence relation 
between s and the rest i-states; sjtT  is the real federal tax rate for commodity j in year t 
(without the sub-index s as long as we deflate by CPI); jstX is a vector of state-specific 
time-varying regressors; while jstε  is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. As 
long as the estimate of γ is different from zero, we can confirm the relevance of a vertical 
tax externality.  
 
In order to isolate the independent impact of the federal tax rate on the tax rate of the 
states, we include other variables that might affect the state tax rate and that must be taken 
into account. These variables are included in the vector jstX . In particular, state taxation 
may be influenced by the economic and demographic environment. As usual in the 
literature, this is controlled for by the following variables: population (and its square), 
per-capita income (and its square), unemployment rate, proportion of population over 65 
and proportion of population between 5 and 17. We also take federal fiscal instruments 
into account, as these may differ from state to state and might condition the setting of 
state tax rates. Thus, we include federal grants-in-aid in relation to total population and 
the federal income tax collected in each state, normalized by the adjusted gross income. 
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As we work with real tax rates and nominal tax rates change infrequently, we control for 
inflation. The political affiliation of the state government may also affect the tax-rate 
level. Thus, we divide the US party system into two main groups: Republicans and 
Democrats. We also build dummies for the governors' membership in each of the two 
political groups and variables to account for the percentage in the House and Senate of the 
two groups. 
 
Certain unchanging characteristics of a state are likely to affect its tax system, such as 
climate or geography, among others. We can take these characteristics into account by 
including a dichotomous variable for each state. Changes in the macroeconomic situation 
may also affect states’ fiscal policies. To account for this, we include a set of time 
dummies, unlike previous studies on vertical tax externalities. This is of key importance 
to our paper. As we explain in Section 3.2.2, this is possible as we use a state price index 
to deflate our federal unitary tax. This ensures that the federal tax rate has time and cross-
sectional variation. Thus, time effects can be included in Equation [1]. To date, common 
shocks in the literature have been controlled by the inclusion of federal GDP and federal 
unemployment, which are only a specific two-linear combination of common annual 
shocks. 
 
3. 2. Data 
 
3.2.1 Nominal tax rates 
 
We use annual data on US states from 1975 to 2006. From 1975 to 1983, the federal 
gasoline tax was four cents per gallon. In 1983, the gasoline tax increased to 9 cents, of 
which 8 financed the Highway Trust Fund and 1 funded the Mass Transit Fund. From 
1987, the rate increased by 0.1 to finance the Underground Storage Tank Leakage Fund. 
On 1 December 1990, the tax rate jumped to 14.1, which generated an increase in 
resources for Transportation grants, but also for the specific purpose “deficit reduction”. 
On 1 October 1993, there was a further increase to 18.4, which was only due to an 
increase in the provision of resources to reduce the deficit. The destination of the revenue 
changed from October 1, 1995, as 2.5 cents were redirected to Transportation grants and 
the rate did not change. More funds were provided for Transportation from October 1, 
1997, since the deficit reduction fund was canceled and the tax rate remained unchanged. 
Therefore, there have been several important statutory tax changes since 1983, while for 
the case of cigarettes, no nominal changes occurred prior to this date. From 1975 to 1983, 
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the federal cigarette tax rate was eight cents per pack of 20 cigarettes; from 1983 it was 
16 cents per pack. The rate then increased to 20 cents per pack in 1991, and 24 cents in 
1993. In 2000 it increased by 10 cents and has been 39 cents per pack since 2002. 
 
Taxes on gasoline and cigarettes vary considerably across states. In 1990, for example, 
the tax per pack on cigarettes ranged from 2 cents in North Carolina to 40 cents in 
Connecticut. In the same year, the tax per gallon of gasoline ranged from 7.5 cents in 
Georgia to 22 cents in Connecticut and Washington. Thus, there is significant cross-
sectional variation.  
 
Taxes on cigarettes vary differently with time according to the state. For example, the tax 
in North Carolina varied from 2 to 5 cents in 1992 and then reached 30 cents in 2005 and 
at 35 in 2006. Connecticut shows more variation, as it had a tax of 21 cents until 1983, a 
change to 26 in 1984, then an increase to 40 in 1989, 45 in 1992, 47 in 1994, 50 in 1995, 
111 in 2002 and finally 151 in 2003. Taxes on gasoline also vary differently over time 
according to the state. Georgia, for example, maintained the same tax (7.5) throughout the 
time period under consideration. In contrast, Connecticut and Washington had a major 
variation over time. Connecticut increased the tax from 10 to 11 cents per gallon in 1976, 
from 14 in 1983 to 38 in 1997; followed by a decrease to 36 in 1998, 32 in 1999 and, 
finally, to 25 in 2002. Washington levied 9 cents till 1976, which rose gradually to 18 in 
1984, 22 in 1990 and 23 in 1991. The tax was then increased to 28 in 2004, 31 in 2005 
and, finally, 34 in 2006.   
 
3.2.2 Real tax rates: CPI vs. HPI  
 
In the previous literature, nominal unitary taxes were divided by CPI to adjust for 
inflation. However, the use of the CPI does not enable us to identify vertical externality. 
This is because it precludes the real federal tax rate from showing cross sectional 
variation, which prevents us from controlling for macroeconomic shocks by using year 
effects. The federal tax could be a particular linear combination of year effects. 
 
However, it is reasonable to consider that prices vary widely across US states and have a 
real impact on federal taxes (see, for example, Albouy, 2008). The increase in the federal 
nominal gasoline tax in 1990 from 9 cents to 14.1 cents did not have the same impact in 
Wyoming as in California. It had a more negative effect on the former than the latter, as 
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the price level is higher in California than in Wyoming. Thus, if we use the same deflator 
in both states, the impact of the federal tax rate on the tax decision of California may be 
overestimated with respect to Wyoming.  
 
To resolve this problem, we use the HPI to deflate financial variables. Shapiro (2006) 
showed that house price differentials among states are the prime determinant of cost-of-
living differences. He found that a 10% increase in the implicit price of land increases the 
price of the market basket of goods and services used to compute the CPI by about 3.2%, 
with a lower bound of 2.2%. Moreover, Albouy (2008) used a geographical partition, as 
defined by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and found that in 2000 “wage and 
housing prices exhibit a strong positive correlation, with a regression line, weighted by 
employment, having a positive slope near one-half.” (p. 24). Therefore, the HPI seems a 
reasonable proxy for a general state price index. 
 
Figure 1, in which we report the HP indices normalized by their corresponding value in 
1975, clearly shows that the type of price index affects the real value of the monetary 
variables that determine state-tax choices. However, in some states, the HPI increases on 
average much more than the CPI, particularly after the 1990s. Most of these are coastal 
states (Figure 1). Hence, some caution should be taken in interpreting our results, since 
the volatility of house prices is significantly different in the coastal states (Figure 2) from 
the rest of the US states (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Davis and Palumbo, 2006; 
Glaeser et al., 2008). In our empirical analysis, we perform a robustness check to test the 
sensitivity of our results to the exceptional performance of house prices in coastal states. 
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3.2.3 The other variables  
 
The rest of the right-hand-side variables of [1], with their definitions, meanings and 
standard deviations are also reported in Table 3. In the following sections, we use data 
that is both normalized by the CPI and by the HPI. In the former case, as previously 
shown in the empirical literature, we control for macroeconomic shocks using the national 
unemployment rate, FEDUNEMP, and the real federal GDP. In contrast, when we use the 
HPI we include year effects.  
 
 
Next, we include a set of time-varying variables that characterize the state’s economic 
and demographic situation: the state population (POP), per capita state income (INC), the 
state unemployment rate (UNEMP), the proportion of individuals in the state who are 
aged between 5 and 17 (CHILD), and the proportion who are over 65 (AGED). The state’s 
political environment can also affect fiscal outcomes. Therefore, we use a dummy 
variable that equals one if the governor is a Democrat, otherwise we use zero 
(DEMGOV). We also account for the proportions of Democrats in the state Senate and 
House of Representatives (DEMSEN and DEMHOU, respectively). The cigarette and 
gasoline industries can affect the state tax rate by lobbying for the rates of their respective 
commodities (Dixit, 1996). Therefore, we use a measure of importance to the state 
economy, as in Besley and Rosen (1998), by including TOBINC (tobacco production per 
dollar of state income) and GASINC (gasoline production per dollar of state income). The 
federal fiscal policy, other than commodity tax rates, may also affect state commodity tax 
rates. Thus, we control for per capita federal grants to the states (GRANTS), and the 
average federal income in the state (INCTAX), defined as the ratio of the state’s federal 
income tax liability to its adjusted gross income. Inflation (INFLATION) is computed as 
the annual growth rate in the corresponding price index. Finally, we account for state 
unchanging characteristics by using state fixed effects. 
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3.3 Empirical strategy 
 
The mean US neighboring tax rate, ∑
≠ si
jstsitw , is endogenous, because it  
can be simultaneously influenced by the tax rate that we are estimating. Then, if this was 
a structural model, a simple OLS estimation of [1] would suffer from endogeneity bias: 
the error term εjst would be correlated with the error terms of the other simultaneous 
equations in the system. In order to overcome the simultaneity bias, we use the two-stage 
least squares method: first, we estimate the reduced forms of the endogenous variables, 
and then we substitute their fitted values into [1]. The residuals of this last equation are 
corrected using the actual values of the endogenous variables. We instrument the mean 
US neighboring tax rate with the US neighboring variables POPst, CHILDst, AGEDst, 
UNEMPst,  DEMSENst, DEMHOUst.  
 
With respect to the federal tax rate, we could also consider that the federal layer and state 
governments set their tax rates simultaneously, which is the case in Devereux et al. 
(2007). In contrast, Besley and Rosen (1998) assume that the federal government is a 
Stackelberg leader and therefore the federal tax rate is exogenous. We take a conservative 
approach and instrument the federal tax rate by using the federal deficit over the federal 
GDP, as Besley and Rosen (1998) did in a robustness check. However, when we use the 
HPI to deflate the federal tax rate and control for year effects, we have no federal 
instrument, and so cannot instrument the federal variable. Consequently, we have 7 
instruments in total. Hence Equation [1], which has one or two endogenous variables 
(depending on the deflator we use), is identified.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The lag of the dependent variable biases all the estimated coefficients of the regression for finite-T 
samples. However, in our case, the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a significant problem, due to the fact 
that our panel runs over 32 years. Therefore, we do not instrument the lagged endogenous variable. 
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Table 4: Gasoline tax rates (1975-2006), using the CPI and HPI deflator
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPI HPI
fedgastax 0.3703 -0.0563 -0.0968 1.1214 0.7761 0.0875
(2.03)** (0.40) (1.21) (5.87)*** (4.21)*** (0.88)
L1stgastax -.- -.- 0.7820 -.- -.- 0.7934
(33.76)*** (37.23)***
Wstgastax -.- 0.9554 0.2439 -.- 0.5157 0.1170
(6.76)*** (3.06)*** (8.40)*** (2.92)***
inflation -45.0680 -31.3973 -103.3521 -6.0178 -6.6109 -75.1240
(0.58) (0.65) (3.54)*** (0.66) (0.75) (13.07)***
population -4.6474 -2.2657 0.5248 -5.5966 -5.0914 -0.1793
(3.12)*** (1.44) (0.70) (4.37)*** (4.30)*** (0.30)
popsq 0.0928 0.0364 0.0006 0.1307 0.1117 0.0143
(3.96)*** (1.26) (0.05) (6.29)*** (5.13)*** (1.36)
fedgdp -1.2077 -0.1833 -0.2360 -.- -.- -.-
(5.31)*** (0.69) (1.79)*
fedunemp -5.6786 -0.8830 -0.8038 -.- -.- -.-
(7.76)*** (0.86) (1.48)
stinc -0.6079 0.2225 0.0453 1.0672 0.6245 0.0523
(1.22) (0.49) (0.20) (4.30)*** (2.45)** (0.48)
stincsq 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0001
(1.35) (0.65) (0.30) (3.53)*** (1.53) (0.26)
stunemp 1.7188 0.2678 0.6687 1.6911 1.1060 0.6162
(3.57)*** (0.48) (1.95)* (3.80)*** (2.44)** (2.04)**
child 219.7473 9.3785 -183.9985 366.3174 103.1825 -1.0938
(2.32)** (0.13) (4.83)*** (5.17)*** (1.34) (0.02)
aged 360.6784 138.8985 31.4811 561.0173 514.2720 120.3130
(1.57) (1.02) (0.42) (5.67)*** (5.32)*** (2.44)**
tobinc -0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.41) (1.90)* (1.61) (1.16) (0.13) (0.75)
gasinc -2.1049 -2.0416 -0.2214 -1.8781 -1.6290 -0.2121
(4.63)*** (4.98)*** (1.37) (6.34)*** (5.49)*** (1.60)
grants*10-7 0.0217 0.0212 -0.0179 -0.2102 -0.2175 -0.0340
(0.58) (0.49) (1.05) (3.51)*** (3.52)*** (1.39)
fedinctax -434.8958 -74.6963 -28.4610 - -97.2346 -66.3272
(6.53)*** (0.84) (0.62) (1.29) (0.96) (1.17)
demgov -0.3233 0.6197 -0.0328 0.6649 0.3383 -0.0490
(0.35) (0.65) (0.06) (0.84) (0.44) (0.10)
demsen -10.6060 3.4049 2.4677 -11.2628 1.8557 1.4519
(1.65)* (0.56) (0.61) (2.19)** (0.36) (0.41)
demhou 28.5083 3.6513 4.3493 22.5508 11.0005 1.9467
(3.27)*** (0.46) (0.90) (3.45)*** (1.72)* (0.50)
Constant 177.5466 13.8365 50.4767 - - -13.9351
(2.53)** (0.22) (1.54) (8.15)*** (5.17)*** (0.79)
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457
r-squared 0.6674 0.6482 0.8909 0.8297 0.8264 0.9428
J-statistics (p-value) -.- 0.1977 0.5709 -.- 0.0901 0.9584
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Two stage least squares regressions where the average of the taxes of the neighbors (Wstgastax) are 
instrumented by using the average of the neighbors of AGED, CHILD, STUNEMP, DEMSEN, DEMHOU while in 
columns 1-3 FEDGASTAX are also instrumented by means of FED DEF. We use the Hansen-Sargan test to test for 
overidentifying restrictions. The J-statistic is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Sargan's statistic is not. 
Since we use the command "robust" and therefore assume the presence of heteroskedasticity, which is quite common 
in a panel for a federal nation such as US, we use, as STATA does, Hansen's J-statistic, which allows observations to 
be correlated within groups. 
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4. Results 
 
We started by using the dataset that had been deflated with CPI. The results are shown in 
Table 4. In column (1), we obtained a positive reaction of states to federal tax increases. 
A $1 increase in the federal gasoline tax provoked a $0.37 increase in the state tax rate 
(5% statistically significant). However, this basic result might be biased,  
as we did not control for horizontal tax competition or for the possibility of inertia in the 
setting of state tax rates. Once we had included spatial lag in the basic model, in column 
(2) the reaction due to the vertical tax externality was no longer significant, while a strong 
horizontal reaction emerged (0.95; 1% significant). Finally, in column (3), we 
simultaneously took into account both factors (horizontal tax competition and inertia). In 
this case, vertical tax externality was still not an issue, while the horizontal tax reaction 
strongly diminished (0.24; 1% significant), but was still significant. We obtained 
significant inertia (today’s taxes are almost 80% of yesterday’s taxes). The presence of 
inertia enabled us to differentiate between a short-term reaction in terms of horizontal tax 
competition (0.24), and a long-term reaction (0.24/(1-0.78)=1.09; which we cannot reject 
as equal to 1). 
 
Nonetheless, the above results might be conditioned by the impossibility of fully 
controlling for macroeconomic shocks. As we argued before, the use of a state price index 
enabled us to enrich the previous empirical specification and include a set of time effects. 
This is shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 4. The previous results were basically 
unchanged. That is, there was no vertical reaction (either in the short-term or the long-
term), there was a significant degree of inertia (0.79 in column 6; 1% significant), and we 
still detected horizontal interaction, although to a lesser extent (0.12 in column 6; 1% 
significant). In this case, the long-term reaction due to horizontal tax competition was 
0.57 (1% significant). 
If we compare the statistical tests of column (3) and column (6), we can see that the 
model that includes time effects has greater explanatory power and the test of over-
identifying restrictions performs better. In addition, the long-term reaction for horizontal 
competition seems more reasonable (i.e., the long-term estimate is below 1) when we use 
the HPI. In fact, if we use the HPI, the results obtained are fully consistent with 
Proposition 1 of Devereux et al. (2007): if demand is price-inelastic, the theoretical 
prediction is that there should be no vertical reaction and the reaction due to horizontal 
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tax competition should be 0.5, which coincides with our long-term estimate (we cannot 
reject at 1% that the estimate is equal to 0.5). Finally, in both sets of regressions, the 
estimate of inflation was negative. That is, regardless of how inflation was measured 
(national vs. state), states seemed to be reluctant to vary their nominal tax rates in the 
presence of inflation, which is coherent with casual observation and with previous 
literature (Bowmann and Mikesell, 1983; Ang-Olson et al., 1999).  
 
In Table 5, we present the same set of results, but for cigarette taxation. The main 
difference can be seen in the horizontal tax competition, which is stronger in this case. 
This result is qualitatively coherent with that of Devereux et al. (2007). When we used the 
CPI, we obtained a short-term reaction equal to 0.35 (1% significant) and a long-term 
reaction equal to 1.54 (1% significant) (column 3). When we used the HPI, we obtained 
0.22 (1% significant) and 0.87 (1% significant) (column 6), respectively. Moreover, when 
inflation was measured by the CPI, it did not have a significant effect on state taxes, that 
is, the states maintained the level of real tax rates, according to the inflation index. 
However, this result might be misleading, as the CPI-based inflation rate does not show 
cross-sectional variation, and so might mimic other uncontrolled factors that also only 
show time variation. In contrast, an increase in the state price index decreases the level of 
real state taxes, which means that states do not take into account variations in the HPI 
when they set their tax rates, or that states are generally reluctant to update their statutory 
tax rates according to the inflation rate.  
 
Overall, for the period 1975-2006, the main difference between using the CPI and the HPI 
is that the latter index gives a lower estimate of horizontal tax competition. Most 
importantly, its long-term value is below one, which guarantees the existence of a Nash 
Equilibrium in the tax-setting. 
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Table 5: Cigarette tax rates (1975-2006), using the CPI and HPI deflator
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CPI HPI 
fedcigtax 10.7467 -2.0222 -0.8002 -0.0322 0.1580 -0.0777
(2.68)*** (1.80)* (1.13) (0.09) (0.44) (0.29)
L1stcigtax -.- -.- 0.7805 -.- -.- 0.7484
(15.04)*** (22.19)***
Wstcigtax -.- 1.1248 0.3461 -.- 0.8380 0.2192
(7.42)*** (2.76)*** (8.79)*** (2.95)***
Inflation 5,324.8541 -1,122.2133 -498.2441 -62.7194 -50.3215 -139.9674
(2.88)*** (1.86)* (1.36) (2.27)** (1.88)* (7.49)***
population -44.6609 46.7264 22.4808 -7.4145 6.2988 4.2950
(1.89)* (3.14)*** (2.55)** (1.07) (0.91) (0.83)
popsq 0.7951 -0.8584 -0.4151 0.1308 -0.1803 -0.0842
(1.84)* (2.94)*** (2.59)*** (0.97) (1.33) (0.90)
fedgdp -8.9289 4.9995 1.4392 -.- -.- -.-
(0.84) (2.38)** (1.16)
fedunemp -24.6514 5.9440 6.6098 -.- -.- -.-
(1.12) (1.20) (2.42)**
stinc -8.0413 -2.2188 0.5332 1.1221 0.2137 0.4060
(1.96)** (0.97) (0.44) (1.52) (0.28) (0.72)
stincsq 0.0267 0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0006
(2.60)*** (0.63) (0.39) (0.74) (0.02) (0.34)
stunemp 9.5487 -4.1719 -0.7096 2.4382 0.2739 -0.0517
(1.19) (1.49) (0.47) (1.67)* (0.19) (0.06)
child -514.0419 -238.2661 -183.3021 1,770.8212 657.3963 7.9823
(0.63) (0.61) (0.87) (6.50)*** (2.07)** (0.04)
aged 3,902.0920 -2,188.9863 -564.1070 1,844.6291 663.3671 417.4967
(1.50) (2.71)*** (1.07) (4.31)*** (1.50) (1.41)
tobinc 0.0442 -0.0092 -0.0002 0.0072 -0.0005 0.0023
(1.93)* (1.36) (0.04) (2.12)** (0.20) (1.13)
gasinc -4.3098 0.7157 -0.3734 -3.2934 -2.7680 -1.4349
(0.83) (0.31) (0.23) (3.08)*** (2.73)*** (1.73)*
grants*10-7 -3.0262 0.6006 0.3377 -0.7449 -0.3638 -0.1472
(2.28)** (1.19) (1.20) (3.98)*** (1.46) (0.94)
fedinctax 4,002.3267 -326.3991 -496.3470 481.7771 245.3470 239.0337
(2.39)** (0.64) (1.68)* (1.19) (0.61) (0.82)
demgov 6.3217 18.1995 6.0954 15.1482 11.8395 3.9283
(0.51) (2.90)*** (1.64) (4.55)*** (3.57)*** (1.74)*
demsen 75.7224 60.3804 22.1756 22.2099 29.4601 9.5122
(0.97) (1.77)* (1.11) (1.10) (1.38) (0.70)
demhou 94.7299 67.9774 38.5570 127.3979 29.7572 19.2426
(1.00) (1.26) (1.34) (4.62)*** (0.94) (0.89)
Constant -1,345.1463 341.4636 -7.2574 -673.5114 -320.1579 -144.3115
(1.86)* (1.27) (0.05) (6.73)*** (3.00)*** (1.95)*
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457
r-squared 0.2717 0.6575 0.8770 0.6636 0.6495 0.8337
'J-statistics (p-value) -.- 0.1449 0.4895 -.- 0.0000 0.2330
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: See Table 4.  
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In the literature review of Section 2, we showed that the time period was of key 
importance for the empirical results, in terms of the vertical tax reaction. We will now 
check whether this is also the case for our empirical approach. To test this approach, in 
Table 6 we compared our results with those obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008). 
As we already know from Section 2, these authors obtained a negative reaction for 
cigarette taxation in terms of vertical externality, once they had restricted the period to 
1983 onwards. In other words, they excluded the late 1970s, in which neither the state nor 
the federal government carried out statutory tax changes. In Table 6, we have replicated 
the regressions for the period 1983-01, with the only difference that we included the 
inflation rate and the lagged endogenous variable. We obtained the same result: a $1 
increase in the federal cigarette tax provoked a $0.48 (5% significant) decrease in state 
taxes. This result was replicated when the inflation rate and the lagged endogenous 
variable were excluded. However, we did not find this result when we included a set of 
time effects. In this case, just as for the whole period, states did not react to federal taxes. 
In Table 6, we also estimated a tax reaction function for gasoline. The estimate of the 
vertical tax externality using CPI was also negative (-0.22, 10% significant) and positive 
but statistically insignificant when we used the HPI. Therefore, the negative reaction 
obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008) is not exclusive to cigarette taxation, but 
disappears when we control for aggregate shocks. 
 
According to the results in Section 3.2.2, the time series performance of house prices was 
not equal across states. In particular, in the case of East (Maryland, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and the states belonging to New England) and West 
(California, Oregon and Washington) coastal states, house prices have suffered an 
exponential increase since the mid-1990s. For example, according to Davis and Palumbo 
(2006), from 1999 till 2004, house prices increased by about 25% in the large cities of the 
Midwest and the Southwest, while in coastal states, they increased by around 80%. The 
trend of house prices in those states is compatible with a generalized price increase in all 
states from 1996 until 2006 (Glaeser et al., 2008). This peculiar price behavior in the 
housing market might make the HPI less reliable as a proxy of a general state price index.  
 
Therefore, in Table 7 we performed a robustness check to test whether our results are 
dependent on that expansionary path of house prices. In columns (1) and (2) we show the 
results excluding the coastal states for gasoline and cigarettes, respectively; while in 
columns (3) and (4) we show results excluding the years from 1996 onwards, again for 
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gasoline and cigarettes, respectively. There were no changes in terms of vertical tax 
externality: state tax rates did not respond to changes in the federal tax rate for gasoline or 
for cigarettes. With respect to horizontal tax competition, we still found this to be an issue 
in the US tax setting.  
Table 6: Gasoline and cigarette tax rates (1983-2001), using the CPI and HPI deflator. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 83-01 CPI 83-01 HPI 
stgastax stcigtax stcigtax stgastax 
fedtax -0.2224 -0.4842 0.2695 0.1756 
(1.91)* (2.01)** (1.16) (0.96) 
L1sttax 0.6354 0.7052 0.7013 0.6447 
(17.97)*** (12.91)*** (15.47)*** (18.22)*** 
Wsttax 0.4235 0.4163 0.3099 0.1689 
(3.46)*** (2.71)*** (3.07)*** (2.07)** 
inflation -16.5453 -117.4722 -119.3227 -71.5054 
(0.33) (0.55) (5.23)*** (7.04)*** 
population -2.2327 20.9977 10.4939 -3.2568 
(1.20) (2.71)*** (2.08)** (2.11)** 
popsq 0.0644 -0.1972 -0.1074 0.0756 
(1.77)* (1.15) (0.94) (2.91)*** 
fedgdp 0.1160 0.2462 -.- -.- 
(0.31) (0.12) 
fedunemp 1.6601 2.7140 -.- -.- 
(1.19) (0.76) 
Stinc 0.6595 -1.5851 -0.0333 0.3483 
(1.73)* (1.12) (0.07) (1.60) 
stincsq -0.0017 0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0008 
(1.65)* (0.97) (0.82) (0.98) 
stunemp 0.6617 -1.0418 0.1751 0.5968 
(1.17) (0.82) (0.22) (1.21) 
Child -42.0604 -461.6379 133.5096 -1.7427 
(0.51) (1.71)* (0.63) (0.02) 
Aged 122.8587 -540.7688 356.1837 178.7325 
(1.05) (1.34) (1.53) (1.75)* 
Tobinc -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0025 
(1.46) (1.05) (0.77) (1.85)* 
gasinc 0.1001 1.7110 -0.6128 -0.4505 
(0.11) (1.12) (0.66) (0.70) 
grants*10-7 -0.0050 0.5298 0.2487 -0.0524 
(0.09) (2.02)** (1.37) (0.67) 
fedinctax 80.1320 196.0545 350.6625 90.8697 
(0.82) (0.56) (1.24) (1.12) 
demgov 0.2847 0.3088 0.1076 0.7354 
(0.31) (0.12) (0.06) (0.96) 
demsen -6.0503 9.7931 -7.2009 -3.4406 
(1.06) (0.53) (0.48) (0.63) 
demhou 3.5102 -8.5052 1.0711 0.2833 
(0.56) (0.35) (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant -59.1895 197.8748 -183.9587 -34.5520 
(0.91) (1.64) (2.50)** (1.33) 
Observations 893 893 893 893 
r-squared 0.8908 0.8961 0.8982 0.9415 
'J-statistics (p-value) 0.3591 0.4071 0.3450 0.3334 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Years effects NO NO YES YES 
Robust z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: See Table 4.  
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Table 7: Robustness check: regressions without coastal states and for the 
period 1975-1995, using the HPI deflator.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Without East and West Period: 1975-1995 
stcigtax stgastax stcigtax stgastax 
Fedtax 0.2319 0.1608 0.0155 0.2533 
(0.65) (1.18) (0.06) (1.27) 
L1sttax 0.7269 0.7800 0.7551 0.7523 
(14.87)*** (30.36)*** (24.85)*** (26.75)*** 
Wsttax 0.3502 0.1423 0.0949 0.0701 
(2.65)*** (2.07)** (2.00)** (1.73)* 
Inflation -149.8047 -75.3660 -115.8719 -77.2606 
(6.22)*** (9.47)*** (8.23)*** (11.37)*** 
population -0.5298 0.3994 3.9908 -2.5119 
(0.04) (0.40) (0.58) (2.17)** 
Popsq 0.1388 0.0109 -0.0306 0.0553 
(0.25) (0.31) (0.23) (2.22)** 
Stinc 0.2477 0.1244 -0.1085 0.2863 
(0.37) (0.91) (0.28) (1.75)* 
Stincsq -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0010 
(0.45) (1.11) (1.32) (1.91)* 
stunemp -0.6926 0.6556 0.6014 0.5104 
(0.58) (1.81)* (0.76) (1.43) 
Child 53.0420 -12.5046 134.6258 -4.5262 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.89) (0.06) 
Aged 615.0438 72.4076 399.3648 260.9417 
(1.59) (1.21) (1.88)* (2.76)*** 
Tobinc -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0001 
(0.21) (0.86) (1.18) (0.19) 
Gasinc -0.7588 -0.1154 -0.5124 -0.8348 
(0.94) (0.64) (0.86) (3.29)*** 
grants*10-7 -0.2018 -0.0113 -0.2187 -0.1494 
(1.12) (0.45) (1.45) (1.99)** 
fedinctax 306.7781 -75.0355 -130.5880 -153.8064 
(0.80) (0.98) (0.67) (1.59) 
demgov 3.8180 -0.1186 -2.7824 -0.1893 
(1.28) (0.19) (1.71)* (0.25) 
demsen -0.0745 -1.1276 1.7605 -1.6200 
(0.00) (0.24) (0.16) (0.35) 
demhou 6.2807 2.9448 20.8194 5.7902 
(0.20) (0.59) (1.29) (1.01) 
Constant -150.7825 -7.6221 -68.9462 -30.5209 
(2.04)** (0.42) (1.12) (1.15) 
Observations 1054 1054 940 940 
r-squared 0.8229 0.9364 0.8975 0.9214 
'J-statistics (p-value) 0.3188 0.4464 0.9199 0.1708 
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Years effects YES YES YES YES 
Robust z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: See Table 4.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
We tested the impact of an increase in federal tax on state tax in the USA, and provide 
evidence that an increase in the federal tax does not affect state tax rates in the case of 
gasoline and cigarettes. Our results differ from those of previous papers, in which mixed 
results were obtained.  
 
The novelty of our empirical approach is that we can identify the impact of the federal tax 
rate on the state tax rate by using a state-specific deflator, the HPI, which differs from the 
usual CPI as it presents cross-sectional variations. This approach allows us to test the 
impact of the federal tax rate on the state tax rate by controlling for macroeconomic 
shocks, proxied by year effects. This is not possible when the CPI is used as a deflator, in 
which the real federal tax rate is perfectly collinear with a particular linear combination of 
year effects. We developed a test using a data set for the USA running from 1975 to 2006 
for cigarette and gasoline taxes. 
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Data Appendix 
 
• tst US cigarette tax rate for state s in year t, divided by the CPI or the HPI. These 
rates are taken from www.OTPR.org: cigarette tax rates are expressed in US 
dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax rates are expressed in US dollars 
per gallon of gasoline. 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
• Tt is the federal US cigarette tax rate. This data is taken from www.OTPR.org. 
• ∑
≠ si
stsitw  is the mean of the states tax rates, divided by the CPI or HPI, of the states 
bordering state s in year t.  
 
 
 
 
Demographic and economic variables 
 
• POPst is the number of persons in state s in year t. This figure is taken from 
www.census.gov. 
• CHILDst  is the ratio of individuals aged 5-17 years to the total population of state 
s  in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• AGEDst  is the ratio of individuals of over 65 years of age to the total population of 
state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• UNEMPst is the unemployment rate for state s in year t, taken from 
www.stats.bls.gov. 
• INCst  is the per-capita income for state s in year t divided by the CPI or HPI. 
Income data were taken from http://www.bea.doc.gov. 
• GRANTst is the per-capita federal grant-in-aid for state s in year t. It is obtained 
from "Federal Expenditures by State" which is part of the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Reports program from US Census Bureau. 
• DEMGOVst dummy=1 if the governor of the state is a Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMSENst proportion of state Senate that is Democratic, taken from the Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMHOUst proportion of state House that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
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• GDPt is the federal GDP for year t divided by the CPI or HPI, taken the Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States. 
• FED UNEMPt is the federal unemployment for year t, taken from the Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States. 
• CPIt (Consumer Price Index) was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the 
United States (2000). 
• HPIst (House Price Index) was taken from http://www.ofheo.gov, the website of 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight in the USA. 
• TOBINCst annual tobacco production (thousand of pounds); from 
http://www.nass.usda.gov, the website of the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service in the USA. 
• GASINCst is the daily gasoline production (thousand barrels per day) per dollar of 
state income in real terms with CPI or HPI; from http://www.eia.doe.gov, the 
website of the Energy Information Administration in the USA. 
• INCTAXst federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income. Federal income 
tax and adjusted gross income are from the http://www.irs.gov, the website of the 
Internal Revenue Service, a Department of the Treasury in the USA. 
 
 
 
